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Abstract 
The Equality Act 2010 was designed to simplify as well as unify British discrimination law.  
While there has been some significant unification, there are a number of areas where it has 
fallen short with regard to simplification, indeed it has introduced or cemented complexity 
and confusion.  This article examines three such areas concerning two of the protected 
characteristics (pregnancy/maternity and gender reassignment) and one of the claims 
(victimisation) within the Equality Act 2010.   
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Public Interest Statement 
British discrimination law grew in a piecemeal fashion from 1970s when the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 and the Equal Pay Act 1970 were introduced.  By 2006 there were 
nine major pieces of legislation, often using inconsistent words.  The Equality Act 2010 was 
designed to unify and simplify (and to a limited extent strengthen) these disparate pieces 
creating single Act to regulate discrimination.  While it has clearly unified the law, it has not 
necessarily simplified it and in some cases the Act has created scope for more confusion.  
This article looks at three areas in particular, namely discrimination because of 
pregnancy/maternity, discrimination because of gender reassignment and the specific claim 
of victimisation. 
 
 
 
  
Enigmas of the Equality Act 2010 – ‘three uneasy pieces’ 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Equality Act 2010 had a long gestation period.  It was designed primarily to simplify, and 
strengthen in places, the diverse discrimination law statute book that had emerged over the 
past 40 years and was the product of independent and governmental reviews in 2000, 2003 
and 20071 during which time the statute book grew ever more complex.  While the Equality 
Act 2010 has unified much of the legislation – and strengthened it in places – it has also 
introduced or cemented complexity and confusion.  It is over twice the length of the draft 
Bill sponsored by Lord Lester in 20032 and while it was subject to many hours of scrutiny and 
proposed amendments3 it has nevertheless been criticised for having many unscrutinised 
provisions.4  This article will consider three areas where further consideration may have 
                                                     
1 Respectively, ‘The Cambridge Review’ (Bob Hepple, Mary Coussey, Tufyal Choudhury (2000) Equality: A New 
Framework Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation (Hart 
Publishing Oxford);  The draft Equality Bill 2003 (Odyseus Trust, Public Statement, 9th July 2002 
Single Equality Bill http://www.odysseustrust.org/equality/press.html later 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldbills/056/2003056.htm; and the Equalities Review and 
the Discrimination Law Review (The Equalities Review (2007) Fairness  and Freedom: The Final Report  of  the  
Equalities  Review. London available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http:/archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalitiesrevi
ew/upload/assets/www.theequalitiesreview.org.uk/equality_review.pdf Department for Communities and 
Local Government, Discrimination Law Review - A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill 
for Great Britain (2007). 
2 B Hepple, Equality – the New Legal Framework (Hart 2011) 6. 
3 Ibid, 5. 
4 See e.g. Dr Evan Harris’s lament at report stage that many amendments will be unscrutinised in the 
Commons (‘It is nothing short of disgraceful that we are in this position now’ HC Deb 2 December 2009, vol 
501, col 1193), Lynne Featherstone’s complaint at Third Reading (‘I deplore the lack of time made available for 
discussion, as it has meant that we have not been able to debate many important and serious issues. That 
abdication of responsibility to democracy makes a farce of any commitment to a different type of politics.’ HC 
Deb 2 December 2009, vol 501, col 1230).   See further Hand, Davis and Barker (2015) 'The British Equality Act 
2010 and the foundations of legal knowledge' 41(1) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 3-28. 
clarified the law, better meeting the aim of making convoluted discrimination law more 
accessible and easier to understand for the ordinary user of the Act.5  
 
The Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination and harassment, related to specific 
characteristics, during certain activities.  It also prohibits victimisation (unfavourable 
treatment because of, broadly-speaking, something done related to a potential claim) and 
promotes equality through limited positive duties.  The three areas considered in this article 
comprise two of the nine protected characteristics within the Act (gender reassignment and 
pregnancy/maternity) and the claim of victimisation. 
 
 
 
 
2.  The Peculiar Status of Pregnancy/Maternity 
 
The Act, as it currently stands, starts with a clear list of protected characteristics in section 4 
(the first three sections containing a weak socio-economic duty which has not been brought 
into force), simply declaring ‘The following characteristics are protected characteristics—    
age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and 
maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation’.  The various definitions and 
prohibitions then outlaw discrimination or harassment relating to those characteristics or to 
a ‘relevant’ sub-set of them.  Thus harassment per se treats only seven of the protected 
                                                     
5 See e.g. The Government’s Draft Legislative Programme 2008/09, p.72, Explanatory Note 61, GEO Factsheet 
The Equality Bill http://www.edf.org.uk/news/Equality%20Bill%20fact%20sheet.pdf 
characteristics as relevant (excluding pregnancy/maternity and marriage/civil partnership) 
but when applied, for example, to the disposal or management of premises a further three 
characteristics (age, religion or belief and sexual orientation) cease to be relevant protected 
characteristics.6  There are also certain characteristic-specific provisions relating to 
disability7, gender-reassignment8 and pregnancy/maternity.9  
Pregnancy/Maternity is the one protected characteristic excluded from the list of relevant 
protected characteristics for indirect discrimination,10 one of two excluded from the list of 
relevant protected characteristics for harassment,11 and the only protected characteristic 
not further defined in sections 5-12 of the Act.  The exclusion from indirect discrimination 
has been described by McColgan as an ‘oddity’ although she noted that circumstances 
which may otherwise have given rise to a claim ‘may of course however also amount to 
indirect sex discrimination’.12  Indeed, in Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police v Keohane 
Langstaff J stated ‘if an allegation arises that there has been indirect discrimination in 
relation to pregnancy, it cannot be asserted as such. If it is discrimination at all it is sex 
discrimination, and must fit the criteria for such a claim’.13  In that case, which concerned 
the removal of dogs from a police dog-handler during her pregnancy and subsequent non-
return of them, the Employment Appeal Tribunal were able to find both direct 
                                                     
6 Equality Act 2010, ss.32(1)(a), 33(6), 34(4) and 35(4). 
7 Equality Act 2010, ss.15,20-22. 
8 Equality Act 2010, s.16. 
9 Equality Act 2010, ss.17-18. 
10 Equality Act 2010, s.19(3). 
11 Equality Act  2010, s.26(5). 
12 McColgan, A (2010) Equality Act 2010 Institute of Employment Rights, 8 December 2010 
http://www.ier.org.uk/system/files/McColgan+paper+equalities+conf+2010.pdf 
13 [2014] ICR 1073, [10]; Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law Bulletin No 429 April 2014, p. 11 
refers to a claim of indirect pregnancy discrimination but, with respect, that is not borne out by the reported 
EAT judgment. 
pregnancy/maternity discrimination and potential indirect sex discrimination.14  However, it 
is clearly not an inevitability that a sex discrimination claim could provide redress and 
Newman has posited that it may not be easy, for example, for a pregnant woman disciplined 
for taking too many toilet breaks to bring an indirect sex discrimination claim.15  The 
exclusion of pregnancy/maternity from the list of relevant protected characteristics was 
explained by the then Solicitor-General during committee scrutiny of the Bill:  
any harassment that a woman is subjected to will be covered by the protection 
against harassment related to sex. The Government therefore considers that specific 
protection against harassment because of pregnancy or maternity is unnecessary 
and would add no value... [during consultation], the Government made clear that it 
would only legislate if there was evidence of a real problem. No such evidence was 
forthcoming in these cases.16 
Nonetheless, the Human Rights Joint Committee, concluded that pregnancy/maternity (and 
marriage and civil partnership) could and should have been included as relevant protected 
characteristics so as to ‘eliminate confusing distinctions’, ‘ensure comprehensive protection’ 
against forms of discrimination not revealed in the consultation but which may nonetheless 
exist and avoid claimants having to take ‘a roundabout route’ attempting to use other 
protected characteristics.17  The singular lack of definition for pregnancy/maternity in those 
                                                     
14 If the Commissioner successfully appealed the direct discrimination finding, the question of justification 
would be remitted to the employment tribunal. 
15 Newman, D (2010) Are comparators necessary in direct discrimination claims? Equal Opportunities Review 
206.  With regard to the pregnancy/maternity specific  provisions he says ‘Although ss.17 and 18 go beyond 
the bare fact of pregnancy and cover pregnancy-related illness and maternity leave, they fall a long way short 
of preventing unfavourable treatment because of any reason arising out of pregnancy, such as a weaker 
bladder.’ 
16 House of Lords and House of Commons Human Rights Joint Committee, Twenty-Sixth Report 2008-2009, 
Letter from Vera Baird QC, to the Chairman, dated 19 June 2009, Annex available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtrights/169/169we07.htm 
17 House of Lords and House of Commons Human Rights Joint Committee, Twenty-Sixth Report 2008-2009, 
para 108. 
sections which appear between the list of protected characteristics and the definitions of 
discrimination (which starts with direct discrimination in section 13), is compensated for by 
the various definitions in the specific pregnancy/maternity provisions (sections 17 and 18).  
The existence of specific provisions, however, does not fully explain that absence as gender-
reassignment and disability both have specific provisions and yet also appear alongside the 
other protected characteristics (being defined in sections 6 and 7).   
In the early years of anti-discrimination legislation, pregnancy or maternity was not covered 
as sex discrimination required a comparison with a man and as Bristow J put it ‘[w]hen she is 
pregnant a woman is no longer just a woman… [s]he is a woman, as the Authorised Version 
of the Bible accurately puts it, with child, and there is no masculine equivalent’.18  This 
approach – and any attempt to compare a pregnant woman with a man on sick leave – was, 
a decade later, disavowed by the ECJ which held that as ‘only women can be refused 
employment on the ground of pregnancy… such a refusal therefore constitutes direct 
discrimination on the ground of sex’.19  Statutory provisions were introduced via the Equal 
Treatment (Amendment) Directive 2002/73/EC leading to section 3A being inserted into the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in 2005,20 so as to ‘improve clarity and transparency in relation 
to this area of the law’ and ‘and avoid the risk of infraction proceedings’.21  This originally 
required the complainant to be treated less favourably compared to how she would have 
been treated had she not become pregnant (or taken a period of maternity leave).  
Following a judicial review, which held that section 3A ‘should be recast so as to eliminate 
                                                     
18 Turley v Allders Department Stores Ltd [1980] ICR 66, 70. 
19 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum Voor Jong Volwassenen (VJV-Centrum) Plus (Case 177/88) [1992] ICR 
325, [12]. 
20 Via reg. 4 of the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/2467. 
21 DTI, Explanatory Memorandum to  the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005:  
Regulatory Impact Assessment, 14 (available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/2467/pdfs/uksiem_20052467_en.pdf). 
the statutory requirement for a comparator who is not pregnant or who is not on maternity 
leave’,22 the wording was simply truncated to ‘a person discriminates against a woman if—
(a) at a time in a protected period, and on the ground of the woman's pregnancy, the 
person treats her less favourably’ (and mutatis mutandis re maternity leave).23  The judicial 
review also made clear that the government did not intend ‘that section 1 should remain 
available in parallel, but that section 3A should be the only route by which a claim for 
discrimination by reference to pregnancy/maternity leave’ should be made.24  A couple of 
years later, the Equality Act 2010 replicated the provision in section 18 (for work cases) and 
section 17 (for non-work cases)25 but adopted the use of ‘unfavourably’ to reduce the need 
for comparison.  However, it also promoted pregnancy/maternity to a protected 
characteristic but that status could be said to be something of a mirage.  
Section 17 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that a person discriminates against a woman if 
that person treats her unfavourably because of a pregnancy of hers or she has given birth 
within the previous 26 weeks.  The period is different under section 18, the work cases 
provision.  There, the protected period begins when the pregnancy begins but ends either 
when her additional maternity leave ends (if she has the right to additional maternity leave 
– which, in general, employees do – and does not return to work sooner) or at the end of 
the period of 2 weeks beginning with the end of the pregnancy.26  A separate sub-section 
provides protection should she be treated unfavourably because she is exercising or seeking 
to exercise, or has exercised or sought to exercise, the right to ordinary or additional 
                                                     
22 R (Equal Opportunities Commission) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] ICR 1234, [63]. 
23 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Amendment) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/656, regs .2(2) and 2(3). 
24 R (Equal Opportunities Commission) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] ICR 1234, [3]. 
25 Protection was extended to cover public functions, education, and associations. 
26 S.18(6) Equality Act 2010. 
maternity leave.27  Both sections hold that direct discrimination within section 13, so far as 
relating to sex discrimination, does not apply to treatment of a woman / anything done in 
relation to a woman in so far as it is for a reason within that section.28  This unambiguously 
prevents a parallel claim in both sex discrimination and under those sections (as was also 
stated to be the case under the old law as mentioned above).  A claim in direct sex 
discrimination could, however, be brought outside the relevant period (in work cases if 
connected to that pregnancy or an illness suffered as a result of it and in non-work cases if 
connected to the fact of having given birth, including breast-feeding beyond six months) but 
could not, in terms, be brought if the treatment was due to exercising the right to maternity 
leave.    
However, section 13 contains no limitation with regard to protected characteristics unlike 
indirect discrimination which delists pregnancy/maternity.  The explanatory notes – as with 
the actual wording of the section – refer to protected characteristics in general and 
specifically reference the list in section 4.29   Furthermore, when explaining associative 
discrimination – that the direct discrimination provision can encompass unfavourable 
treatment because of the complainant’s association with someone who has the protected 
characteristic – the notes solely exclude marriage/civil partnership from such coverage.30  
Given its status as a protected characteristic in section 4, its inclusion in the list of relevant 
protected characteristics for the public sector equality duty in section 149 (which again 
solely excludes marriage/civil partnership), the application of the positive action provisions 
                                                     
27 S.18(4) Equality Act 2010.  Ordinary Maternity Leave (OML) and Additional Maternity Leave currently both 
last for 26 weeks.  As OML may be take up to 11 weeks before the due date the period post birth could run 
from 15 weeks to 52 weeks.  However, as worded, the unfavourable treatment – as opposed to the leave – 
need not take place in that period.  S.18(3) covers compulsory maternity leave (2 weeks or 4 weeks if a factory 
worker). 
28 Ss. 17(6) and 18(7) Equality Act 2010. 
29 Para 59. 
30 Para 60. 
(sections 158 and 159) to all protected characteristics (with one of the examples in the 
explanatory notes alluding to maternity),31 and the clear lack of indication of exclusion as is 
freely made elsewhere, pregnancy/maternity could be seen to be included within section 
13.  This is brought into doubt, however, by section 25 which explicitly set out what is meant 
by the nine discriminations (for example “Age discrimination is— (a) discrimination within 
section 13 because of age; (b) discrimination within section 19 where the relevant protected 
characteristic is age” and “Gender reassignment discrimination is— (a) discrimination within 
section 13 because of gender reassignment; (b) discrimination within section 16; (c) 
discrimination within section 19 where the relevant protected characteristic is gender 
reassignment) and which for maternity/pregnancy solely refers to the special provisions in 
sections 17 and 18. 
From the above it can be seen that, somewhere, something is missing (or erroneously 
included).  Either the summarising section 25 has omitted pregnancy/maternity from the 
scope of section 13 or section 13 should have followed the example of section 19 in delisting 
the protected characteristic.  Sections 17 and 18 (and their predecessors) were designed to 
clarify the extant law and so sex discrimination – bar the attempt at clarification – could 
have covered the ground.  In attempting to clarify the law, a time based division has been 
introduced which serves only to confuse.  Given the inherent overlap with sex, a declaratory 
provision including pregnancy/maternity within the definition of sex, and thereby removing 
it from the list of protected characteristics, is one way greater clarity could have been 
achieved.  Alternatively, greater legislative scrutiny could have rendered it not only a 
protected characteristic but part of a cogent and consistent legislative scheme. 
 
                                                     
31 Para 517. 
3.  The Characteristic of Gender Reassignment – Limited and Indeterminate 
 
The Equality Act 2010 broadly replicated previous law regarding gender reassignment 
although it has slightly extended its coverage (to cover activities such as the provision of 
services) and its definition. Originally, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 did not contain any 
provision for the protection of those who were in process of gender reassignment; the 
protection under the SDA was purely available to heterosexuals who were able to compare 
their treatment to someone of the opposite sex.32 This was changed as a result of the ruling 
in the European Court of Justice which held that dismissal of an employee was contrary to 
the Equal Treatment Directive where ‘dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related to a 
gender reassignment must be regarded as contrary to Article 5(1) of the Directive [which 
concerned discrimination on the ground of sex].’ 33  This decision latterly led to section 2A 
being inserted into the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 which defined gender reassignment as 
‘a process undertaken with medical supervision’. 34 It is this aspect of the definition that has 
been changed but arguably to an ambiguous and yet limited outcome.  The requirement for 
medical supervision has been removed but the Act explicitly ignores non-binary gender 
among other things. 
  
Transgender is an umbrella term which describes those who feel the need to present 
themselves in a gender other than the one they were assigned to at birth. Non-binary refers 
to any gender that is not exclusively male or female. A transvestite is someone who wears 
clothing of the opposite gender to the one to which they were assigned at birth but may 
                                                     
32 s1 Sex Discrimination Act 1975; and, in a discrete provision, to married persons in the employment field 
(s.3). 
33 P v S and Cornwall County Council  Case C-13/94, [1996] IRLR 347.  
34 Via the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/1102. 
nonetheless identify with their original gender.   A person who feels that they should live 
permanently – or variably – in the gender opposite to the one assigned at birth are 
transsexual. People who have intersex conditions are born without genitals which clearly 
identify that they are either male or female and decisions have to be made as to which sex 
should be attributed to them.  Transsexuals will often (although not always and certainly not 
necessarily) take appropriate steps to change their body to reflect their inner gender.  It is 
the process of moving to one gender from another that is ‘gender reassignment’. The terms 
transgender and intersex are often confused by many people as they perceive these groups 
as wishing to choose their own gender identity. Although it is true that some intersex 
individuals will go on to change their gender in later life and actually see themselves as 
transgender, the two groups are distinct. It is also true that those who have intersex 
conditions face different forms of discrimination from those who are transgender however 
only some countries, notably Australia, have publicly acknowledged that those with intersex 
conditions have different needs from those who identify as transsexual.35 
 
The Equality Act 2010 explicitly relates to gender reassignment and transsexualism.  
However, the underlying rationale for the coverage of transsexualism could be taken to 
apply more widely.  Why in the words of the seminal case of P v S and Cornwall County 
Council would toleration of discrimination against those undergoing or have undergone a 
process of transition “be tantamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to respect the 
dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to 
                                                     
35 Whittle, S., Turner, L. and Al-Alami, M. Engendered Penalties: Transgender and Transsexual People’s 
Experiences of Inequality and Discrimination London: The Equalities Review (available online: 
http://www.pfc.org.uk/pdf/EngenderedPenalties.pdf 
safeguard”36 whereas such discrimination against those who do not wish to live 
permanently in a changed gender, or who merely wish to wear clothes related to another 
gender, would not?  Why should the former be deemed to be ‘based, essentially if not 
exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned’37 any more than the latter?  This apparently 
restrictive approach is in contrast to the removal of the requirement for medical supervision 
and undermines any proposition that the question of certainty is a reason for the distinction 
(as regards non-binary gender if not transvestism).  The Code of Practice on Employment 
also states that there is no requirement for the individual to discuss with their employer 
their gender status.38 The removal of any reference for the need of medical intervention and 
the fact that the employee is not required to discuss his/her plans with his/her employer 
creates such a situation of uncertainty.  
  
It has been suggested that there are two phases of being transsexual – primary and 
secondary. The main characteristic of primary transsexualism deals with “a lifelong of 
gender dysphoria – these are the feelings that a transsexual experiences because of the 
incongruity of his/her gender, a history of cross-gender identity, and an absence of fetishism 
associated with cross dressing”.39  Docter goes on to explain that the main characteristic of 
secondary transsexualism deals with the “history of some sexual arousal to cross dressing, 
progressively stronger history of gender dysphoria which may be stress related, less ego 
integration than in transvestites…..”40.  Secondary transsexuals are very different from 
primary transsexuals in one very different important aspect. Primary transsexuals have a 
                                                     
36 P v S and Cornwall County Council  Case C-13/94, [1996] IRLR 347, [22]. 
37 Ibid. [21]. 
38 Statutory Code of Practice – Employment, EHRC para 2.27.  
39 Docter, Richard. Transvestitles and Transsexuals: Towards a Theory of Cross-Gender Behaviour. New York: 
Plenum Press, 1988  
40 ibid 
life-long history of intense gender dysphoria and secondary transsexuals should have an 
absence of this.  Such a summary as this highlights the fact that there is often transition 
between transvesitism and transsexulaism. Nangeroni41 categorises this as 
“transgenderism.”  She states that “a transgender person is someone whose gender display 
at least sometimes runs contrary to what other people in the same culture would normally 
expect.” Obviously this is a very general definition and what is considered ‘the norm’ will 
depend on the attitudes of society  and to some extend the protection available to all of us. 
In effect, this definition could apply to females who dress in perceived male clothing (we 
used to call them tom boys).   It could also relate to men whose dress could be seen as more 
feminine or more flamboyant. This brings us back to a key point: at what point does the 
Equality Act protect transgender?   
 
It would appear that the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Equality Act protect gender 
reassignment and not non-re-assigned transsexuals.  The removal of the requirement for 
medical intervention obscures that line and arguably renders the distinction between being 
a transvestite (where no protection exists) and being a transgendered person artificial.  
However, as things currently stand, the question ‘at which point does protection start’, is 
still answered – to an unsatisfactory extent – by reference to a pre-2010 case. 42 In Croft v 
Royal Mail, the Employment Appeal Tribunal considered that pre-operative male was a man 
and therefore there was no discrimination in preventing use of a female toilet.  The Court of 
Appeal took a more subtle approach and held that gender reassignment protection covered 
all stages of the reassignment under medical supervision but that it was correct to prohibit 
                                                     
41 Nangeroni, Nancy “Transgerderism:Tansgressisng Gender Norms.” GenderTalk 1996 (24 the April 1997) 
<://www.gendertalk.com/TGism/tgism.htm> 
42 Croft v Royal Mail [2003] IRLR 592.  
use of the female toilet for a period of time during which Ms Croft could use the unisex 
(disabled) toilet.  This pragmatic approach left open in what circumstances pre-operative 
male to female transsexuals may use female facilities with the Court of Appeal stating that 
employers should be flexible.  With the removal of the medical supervision requirement and 
with no clear guidance within the Equality Act the issue of at what point does protection 
begin is still left open to interpretation by employers. 
   
Being a transvestite was not protected under the old law and when the Equality Act was 
introduced it was not a surprise to find that protection was not there, nor that there was 
any protection for those who identify as non-binary gender.  An individual who is a 
transvestite may only be protected under the Act if they can frame their claim by reference 
to one of the nine protected characteristics.  Although It may be seen that transvestites are 
one stage further removed unless their transvestism is related to transexuality or a 
protected characteristic, the interpretation of the decision in P & S v Cornwall Council does 
suggest that ‘dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related to a gender reassignment must 
be regarded as contrary to Article 5(1) of the Directive” may still offer the opportunity for a 
non-binary persons at least, if not transvestites, to argue that as at some point in the future 
he/she may opt for permanent gender reassignment, and thus fall within the protection of 
the Act. 
 
4.  Victimisation – an invalid variation 
 
Victimisation, less favourable treatment because of something done in good faith (or 
something which the defendant thinks may have been, or may be, done) related to a 
potential claim, had been part of modern British discrimination law since its beginning, with 
for example section 4 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 defining ‘discrimination by way of 
victimisation’.  Similar provisions appeared in the Race Relations Act 1976 (s.2), Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (s.55) and the three Employment Equality Regulations covering 
religion or belief, sexual orientation and age.43  While the later extension of the coverage of 
religion or belief and sexual orientation to goods and services did not use the word 
‘victimisation’, the concept was nonetheless included within sub-provisions of 
discrimination.44  The main, heralded change during the unification into the Equality Act 
2010 was that section 27 dispenses with the old formulation that required ‘less favourable 
treatment’, preferring instead to subjecting to a detriment which  it is said (together with 
both the removal of the word ‘discrimination’ and its placing under a heading of ‘other 
prohibited contract’)renders it no longer a form of discrimination, as ‘there is no longer a 
need to compare treatment of an alleged victim with that of a person who has not made or 
supported a complaint under the Act’,45 but a separate claim.  However, the subjecting to a 
detriment must still be ‘because of’ something done (or perceived to be done) in connection 
with the Act.  An element of comparison could thus be said to remain - for how else can one 
determine whether a detriment is because of such a thing or because of an unrelated 
matter.  An actual comparator is clearly not required but some form of hypothetical 
comparator arguably remains in the picture. 
 
An apparently more significant change wrought by the Equality Act 2010 was that 
victimisation appeared to be removed from post-employment protection.  Section 108 
                                                     
43 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1660, Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1661, Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031. 
44 S.46(4) Equality Act 2006 and reg. 3(5) Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/1263. 
45 Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010, para 103. 
makes it unlawful to discriminate against, or to harass, someone after a relationship 
covered by the Act has ended.  This replicated provisions in the predecessor legislation but 
with two differences: it expanded the coverage to more fully cover non-employment 
relationships and it in terms excluded victimisation (sub-section (7) holding ‘But conduct is 
not a contravention of this section in so far as it also amounts to victimisation of B ).  The 
explanatory notes on the section state that ‘if the treatment which is being challenged 
constitutes victimisation, it will be dealt with under the victimisation provisions and not 
under this section’ (353).  The victimisation provision, however, no more explicitly covers 
post-relationship situations than the discrimination and harassment provisions.  Failure to 
cover post-employment victimisation would breach European obligations,46 but that 
seemed to be the express intention – as set down in legislation – of Parliament.  This led to a 
series of cases in which the EAT and Court of Appeal tussled with the provision.  
 
In Rowstock v Jessemy, Mr Recorder Luba QC and two lay members, were ‘amply satisfied 
that the effect of the literal words of section 108(7) is to produce a lacuna in the statutory 
scheme of protection from discrimination, harassment and victimisation which the UK is 
required by EU legislation to enact’. 47   While they were tempted to follow the approach of 
the Employment Judge in reading ‘employment’ as including post-employment, to do so 
would both be an incomplete re-casting, as section 108 extends beyond employment 
relationships and it would leave, for example, goods and services – and even partnerships – 
unprotected and impermissibly cross the interpretive Rubicon in “flying directly in the face 
of what Parliament has actually enacted in section 108 (whether for ‘good’ reason or ‘bad’ 
                                                     
46 E.g. Equal Treatment Framework Directive (2000/78/EC), the Race Directive (2000/43/EC) and Coote v 
Granada Hospitality Ltd (C-185/95) [1998] ECR I-5199. 
47 [2013] IRLR 439, [29]. 
reason or through error or inadvertence)”.48  A short while later, the EAT in Akwiwu & Anor 
v Onu49 noted the strength in arguing that as express mention was made of victimisation, 
but only so as to exclude it, in section 108, the draftsman must have had victimisation in 
mind and the limitation could thus be seen to be deliberate.50  However, this troubling and 
not ‘easy to discern’51 provision, which neither party could satisfactorily explain, could, they 
thought, best be considered as excluding something from the operation of the section 
because another provision (within or outwith the Equality Act 2010) provided recompense 
(for otherwise there would be no need to restrict the claim if no claim existed).52  
Accordingly, as a matter of domestic construction they rejected an interpretation which 
excluded claims for post-employment victimisation.   
 
The Court of Appeal, when considering both cases, in the appeal of Rowstock, took yet a 
different approach.53  A later Court of Appeal judgment, Deer v University of Oxford, 
summarised the case as holding ‘that this [was] one of those exceptional cases where the 
court can confidently say that the draftsman has erred and has, by an oversight, failed to 
reflect Parliament's clear intention, and is in a position to remedy that error.’54  However, 
the primary method was to rely on the requirement under European Union law to read 
national law so far as possible as complying with the European obligation55 and they found 
                                                     
48 [2013] IRLR 439, [38]. 
49 [2013] ICR 1039 
50 [2013] ICR 1039, [71]. 
51 [2013] ICR 1039, [73], [75]. 
52 [2013] ICR 1039, [76]. 
53  Jessemey v Rowstock Ltd & Anor [2014] ICR 550 
54 [2015] IRLR 481, [30].  Following the House of Lords’ criteria in Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution [2000] 
1 WLR 586 (it being legitimate to correct an inadvertent drafting failureif the court was both sure of the 
intended purpose and confident as to what was the intended substance of the provision that bar the error 
would have been enacted). 
55 The case summarily refers to this as the Ghaidan approach (at [38] et seq) but cites Pickstone v Freemans plc 
[1989] AC 66, Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 546 and Vodafone 2 v Her Majesty's 
nothing to prevent such a reading in terms of implying in a subsection allowing post-
employment victimisation claims.  As for the meaning of sub-section (7), Underhill LJ 
commented:  
I am not sure that anything needs to be done about sub-section (7). In the unlikely 
event that anyone seeks to rely on it in future, some other court can cudgel its brains 
about what real effect, if any, it has: all that matters for present purposes is that it 
can have no meaning which is inconsistent with post-termination victimisation being 
unlawful.56 
Whatever the approach, the result would be a judicial implication of a subsection allowing 
such claims.  If a predominantly national approach was adopted (as in Akwiwu in the EAT), 
the disparate treatment of victimisation and discrimination/harassment would create a 
peculiar mish-mash of post-employment claims being within the primary provision for the 
former but in a dedicated ancillary provision for the latter.  However one looks at it, the Act 
is in an unsatisfactory state regrading victimisation.  It may now be clear that post-
employment victimisation is covered by the Act; the tangible Act itself is far less clear.57   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite its long gestation period there were a number of clear errors in the Equality Act 
2010 as originally passed, such as a reference in schedule 3, para 8(2) originally referring to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Commissioners of Revenue and Customs [2009] EWCA Civ 446 as well as Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 
557. 
56 Jessemey v Rowstock Ltd & Anor [2014] ICR 550, [49]. 
57 Such lack of clarity or confusion was noted in Jessemey at [46]:  ‘…This error [a rogue inclusion of s.108 as 
defining discrimination in the Index of Defined Expressions in schedule 28] is not directly material to the 
problem before us, but it reinforces the impression that the draftsman may rather have lost his way in his 
treatment of section 108.” 
‘section 17 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1982’ rather than 1980 or the wording of the 
compromise agreements provision appearing to exclude any lawyer or official who had 
previously advised the complainant from advising him/her on the compromise agreement 
and requiring a further person to provide advice with a likely increase in cost.58  The subjects 
of this article are less clear-cut but are further examples of either a lack of parliamentary 
scrutiny or of political will or both.  The Equality Act 2010 has helped unify the law in the 
area but as things stand the existence of such enigmatic or merely inadequately transposed 
provisions are testament to a failure to make the law more accessible and easier to 
understand for the ordinary user of the Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
58 Which led to an amendment via the Equality Act 2010 (Amendment) Order 2012/334 to make it clear that 
the existing advisers can continue to advise (by inserting ‘to the complainant’ after ‘independent adviser’ and 
then inserting ‘(other than the complainant)’ so that section 147(5)(a) reads ‘a person (other than the 
complainant) who is a party to the contract or the complaint’). 
